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1Is Secularism History?
Introduction: the postsecular turn
It seems uncontroversial to portray Gellner as a secular thinker, indeed as one of the surest 
defenders, amongst social theorists, of secularism as a mode of life and thought. Especially in 
Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (1992a) Gellner forced a three-way ultimatum between 
his own favoured Enlightenment secular rationalism, postmodernist relativism, and strenuous 
religious revival. In his excellent biography of Gellner, John Hall describes him as ‘a constant 
critic of religion’, pointing in particular to his contempt for modernist theology (Hall, 2010: 
239). Most generally, Gellner’s consistent analytical approach towards religion was 
functionalist: observing its various affective qualities and effects, and placing these within the 
logic of a real historical world impossible to grasp, cognitively, in religious terms. That in 
turn would seem to constitute exactly the sort of ‘methodological atheism’ that has 
characterized the critical social science project from its beginnings.
So the task of this essay, to indicate how Gellner might response to the currently widespread 
critical re-appraisal of secularism as the basis for explanation, critique and normative-
political engagement, would seem straightforward enough. In a very short period the status of 
the ‘secularization thesis’, for example, has ‘shifted markedly’ (Davie, 2014: 437). From a 
seemingly agreed empirical matter of historical process, the idea that religion steadily 
declines in salience and strength in modern industrial society is now held by many to be a
2meta-theoretical projection of sociology’s secularist values. Thus, a consistent secularization-
ist such as Steve Bruce, strongly influenced by Gellner (Bruce, 2011: 26), feels unfashionable 
and beleaguered in mounting yet another clarification of the position. In the history of 
political ideas, in the USA, Mark Lilla’s Gellner-like affirmation of a ‘Great Separation’ 
stemming from the seventeenth century between civic liberal-democratic politics and political 
theology has been roundly ticked off as a dangerous ‘folly’ (Lilla, 2007; Stout, 2008). In 
British multiculturalist discourse, previous core secular propositions – that religion became 
differentiated ‘from the modern state, politics and public life; that religion and liberalism are 
inevitably at odds with each other; and that secularism has a more constitutive relation with 
liberalism than religion’ (Woodhead, 2013: 93) – are strenuously under fire. In a related 
move, a firm contrast is drawn – with Michael Oakeshott’s presence hovering in the 
background – between acceptable, sensible, ‘moderate’ secularism, in which the claims of 
religious identity and the presence of religion in politics can respectfully be accepted, and 
unacceptable, extreme, ‘ideological’ secularism (Modood, 2010). We can readily imagine 
Gellner rising up at this, not only to chastise anyone who finds themselves taken by 
Oakeshott’s obscurantist upper-class traditionalism (e.g. Gellner, 1996a: 630-33), but also to 
remind us that circumspect middle-of-the road positions are generally every bit as ideological 
as the bolder ones they trade upon. 
Moving slightly Leftwards, Jurgen Habermas continues to feel, as Gellner did, that ‘the 
cleavage between secular knowledge and revealed knowledge cannot be bridged’ (Habermas, 
2010: 17). Yet reason, for Habermas, must now learn from religion in a new solidaristic 
‘awareness of what is missing’ in secularized society – sentiments that Gellner would query. 
Within Marxist circles, a veritable ‘theological turn’ is said to be taking place (Therborn,
2010: 130-32), in Terry Eagleton’s version of which a definite echo of Gellner’s Words and 
3Things can be heard. Only this time it is not the Wittgensteinian domesticity of linguistic 
philosophy that is pilloried as the cosy ideological View from North Oxford, but secular 
rationalism itself (Eagleton, 2009:  34-5).
So we might expect Gellner to issue a sharp consumer health warning against the latest tepid 
products of what he liked to dub the ‘re-enchantment industry’. Yet what Gellner takes 
secularism to be, exactly, and how far secularism might be a big issue for him are not that 
easy to determine. There is no entry, for example, for ‘secular’ or ‘secularism’ in Hall’s 
biography, nor do the terms get more than a passing mention in prominent reviews of it (eg. 
Gray, 2011, Collini, 2011). In neither Gellner’s substantial (posthumously published) ‘Reply 
To Critics’ nor in the long and important volume covering the whole of his work, to which he 
was responding (Hall and Jarvie, 1996), is secularism – or even religion as such (though 
Islam features as a very specific social formation) – given more than incidental attention. The 
same can be said of the only significant retrospect to appear since then (Malesevic and 
Haugaard, 2007). Even in Postmodernism, Reason and Religion, Gellner no sooner declares 
for Enlightenment secular fundamentalism than this phrase slides without comment into 
rationalist fundamentalism, as though the ‘secular’ connotation did not greatly matter. 
Of course, all discussions of secularism are tricky, just because of the slipperiness of 
the central terms. In A Secular Age, Charles Taylor identifies three senses of secularity as a
long-term cultural phenomenon: the emergence of ‘secularized public spaces’, the ‘decline of 
belief and practice’, and ‘new conditions of belief’, the latter referring to the altered 
philosophical and social context, in modernity, ‘in which all search and questioning
about the moral and spiritual must proceed’ (Taylor, 2007: 20). Borrowing from Taylor, but
making his own triune intervention, Jose Casanova (2011) talks about secularity,
secularization(s) and secularism(s). Then there are some more specific features of secular
4politics in liberal societies: freedom of basic belief, equality of status of religions and non-
religions (no structurally privileged faiths), and, latterly, an attitude of inclusion towards all
faiths (and none) in determining the social and political identity of collective national life (see
e.g. Levey and Modood, 2009). On top of all that, secularity and secularism can be filled out
either procedurally in terms of a hospitable pluralistic scaffolding for the acceptance of
different views, motives and practices, or substantively, in terms of – what? – some sort of
atheism, materialism, naturalism, humanism, or socialism. For reasons of space, I will
proceed in a rather intuitive way now that I have thrown into play these suggestive
distinctions. I shall also concentrate on the socio-philosophical aspects of
secularity/secularism rather than the constitutional-political aspects, partly because Gellner’s
thinking on the latter follows fairly consistently from his approach to the former (see
Conditions of Liberty (1996b) for his last thoughts on the required political ethos of civil
society).
One last introductory point is extremely important: critical re-appraisers of secularism, 
whether social-theoretical or political, are seldom anti-secular as such, though this is usually 
how the rhetoric shapes up (McLennan, 2010a). Rather, they are intra- or post-secular, in the 
sense that they want to reject or deconstruct past and present secularisms that are thought to 
be aggressive, unreflexive, or Eurocentric. So Taylor and others tend to say instead that good, 
procedural, inclusive secularity is ‘much too important a matter to be left to “secularists”’ 
(Taylor, 2009: xxii). Let us then try to work out how Gellner would have intersected with this 
congeries of tensions.  Useful re-appraising volumes (e.g. Calhoun et al., 2011) encompass a 
long list of issues, which can be compressed for our purposes, beginning with two respects in 
which Gellner does not seem to fit the cartoon version of the firm secularist.
5Secularization 
If the secularization thesis is taken to entail the steady disappearance of religion in modern 
societies, whereby modernity is almost by definition secular, such that fully religious 
people/societies simply cannot be regarded as fully modern, then reappraisers robustly 
counter it as a descriptive and analytical account. To that end, evidence to the contrary is 
drawn from non-Western societies, from the USA, from updated profiles of European 
nations, from widespread spiritual practices (even allowing for a decline of Christian church 
attendance), and from the new clamouring for recognition of the political pertinence of 
religion in existing secular contexts. Conceptually, questions are raised about historical 
causality, multiple modernities, and the presumption of generalised ‘disenchantment’. The 
conclusion is reached that ‘the secular’, supposedly once the norm, is now the exception, and 
under pressure. 
Gellner would not greatly disagree. As a quintessential big picture thinker he frequently 
consigned rather major matters to the historically secondary category. Thus: ‘by and large’, 
‘it would seem reasonable to say that it [secularization] is real…the secularization thesis does 
hold’. Even so, ‘secularization does assume many quite different forms’ and its ‘extent, 
homogeneity or irreversibility’ are debatable (1992a: 5). These are significant qualifications. 
The locution ‘it would seem reasonable to say…’ registers genuine provisionality, and we 
might reasonably take strong secularism to require the irreversibility of secularization as a 
central tenet. Moreover, Gellner strikingly argued, ahead of the postsecular game, that 
because Muslim society and Islamic fundamentalism are well enough suited to modernity, no 
invariable association holds between modernity and secularity/ism. He does think that it was 
6only because the original secular moment happened specifically in the Christian West that 
late-comer societies could work out how to by-pass outright secularism. He also detects 
elements of ‘generic protestantism’ in Islamic belief and practice, generic protestantism –
alternatively couched as generic Reformation – being, for him, a definite secularizing force 
emerging out of the monotheistic era (1988: 103-5, 111-112). This, he says, attunes religion 
(Islam) to ways of working and thinking that are required for technological and economic 
growth. However, neither Islam nor non-Western, religion-prevalent modernity are destined 
to become steadily more secularized (1988: 218; 1992a: 22).
As for liberal capitalist secular societies, Gellner never equates the decline of organized 
religion and the material and cognitive dominance of science and technology with the actual 
or likely disappearance of religion-like needs and pursuits. True, he regularly comments, 
acerbically, that in a largely secularized society religious faith is upheld ‘symbolically’ rather 
than deeply, with beliefs systems inherited from agrarian societies being carried on in 
‘Bowdlerized’, ‘selectively interpreted’ and ‘muted’ form (1988: 214; 1992b: 151). But 
Gellner does not accuse contemporary believers of being insincere, nor assumes that no-
nonsense secularists are simply going to push them aside. In fact, he re-designated the 
Weberian iron cage of disenchanted rationality as a rubber cage, because the ‘impulse to 
systematize and eliminate incoherence’ is constantly deflected and counter-balanced by off-
duty and come-back re-enchantment. When it comes down to it, ‘we do not know’, Gellner 
confesses, ‘how to decide’ between these ‘hard and soft aspects’ of our predicament (1987: 
164-65). One feasible outcome is that a kind of ‘constitutional religion’ will prevail’ (on a 
parallel with constitutional monarchy), in which ‘lukewarm faith’ gives just sufficient enough 
cement to hold together the vying demands of contemporary experience (1992a: 93). 
7From this encapsulation, Gellner was certainly not one of those secular social scientists that –
or so we are told by Calhoun et al. (2011: 4) – hugely underestimate religion and values as 
social motivation. We also need to remember that Gellner’s ‘by and large’ take on 
secularization as a central tendency within industrial modernity is remarkably similar to the 
the version provided by Taylor himself, the most eminent opponent of secular ‘subtraction 
stories’ (McLennan, 2010b). Both thinkers highlight secularization as the pluralization and 
mutual ‘fragilization’ (Taylor) of belief systems in a context of relentless (and in its place 
necessary) instrumental rationality. 
Secularity and religiosity: symbiosis 
Postsecularists tends to emphasize that the very notion of the ‘secular’ is inextricably rooted 
in Christian theology, so that it is impossible even to specify its meaning without grasping 
that profound semiotic entanglement. Thus, the definitive connotation of the secular as ‘this 
worldliness’ is bound up with contrasts and complementarities between the heavenly city and 
earthly existence; between the eternal time (of God) and the time of the ‘saeculum’ or 
‘century’ (itself a pointer towards the return of Christ); between monastic spiritual discipline 
and priestly pastoral responsibility, and so on. Secondly, the whole history of secular inroads 
into previous ‘traditional’ certainties, all the key stepping-stone doctrinal and institutional 
moments, represent internal shifts within the devoted consciousness, not external 
penetrations or vanguard thrusts spearheading an always-existing unbelieving truth. But 
secularists (or so it is said) always assume the latter: they see secularity and secularism as 
what was always waiting to come into its own, and nowadays they think it has emerged fully 
8as the default state of the world, the absence of religion, the attainment of a ‘neutral’ world 
view. And all this, for post and anti-secularists, is deeply mistaken. Secularism is a world-
making project, a set of (religiously derived) presences, a regime of truth. It follows that not 
only religion but secularity/ism too requires full investigation and explanation as a socio-
historical phenomenon, without prior commitment either to its substantive content or to its 
‘naturalized’ status within social science itself (Casasnova, 2011: 56). And in that regard, 
secularisms might simply be considered variants of faith and metaphysics, seeing as 
secularists tend to proselytize about the vibrant light of their own understanding and the dark 
absurdity of religion; and given the violence, tragedy, and evil visited on the world in the 
name of secular progress. 
Again, Gellner would grant a fair amount of this.  Like Taylor, he underlines as historically 
central the way in which successive bouts of reforming theological zeal led to the defeat of 
magic and socially fused, essentially ritualistic religion – the common obstacle facing 
monotheism and secularism alike. Gellner’s first ‘big ditch’ in history, crossing into the 
‘Axial Age’, saw the true birth of the Transcendent, whose midwife was the development of 
writing, the Word. Freed from situations of co-presence involving speakers and listeners, 
doctrinal authority (‘generic Platonism’) became primary, with content outranking context 
and universality emerging as a matter of ever-more-refined conceptual ‘quality control’ in the 
hands of the intellectual priestly caste. The second big ditch, crossing into secular modernity, 
was driven by science, but always in a transcendence- and faith-obsessive fashion, with 
earnest enquirers seeking avidly to read aright the natural work of the ‘single, exclusive, 
jealous and iconoclastic deity’. The ethereal universality of Platonism thus gives way to a 
personalized, guaranteed Transcendent, with ‘centralized faiths offering generic all-purpose 
salvation’. And from here, Gellner develops an expanded Weberian account: protestant-style 
9Christianity does away with the ‘audio-visual aids’ of transcendence, denies the existence of 
any sacramentally distinct priesthood, internalises moral authority, holds all concepts and 
people under God’s jurisdiction to be equal and accountable, and as a result an ‘explosion’ 
takes place in both the cognitive ethic of appraisal and economic productivism (Gellner, 
1979: 323; 1988: 73-89, 103-106). There is no suggestion here that, historically, society and 
human understanding as a whole can be treated as, first, definitively ‘religious’, then 
definitively ‘secular’. It was all more complicated and interwoven than that. There can be no 
doubt, then, that it is religion that provides the ‘main agency’ that endows man with reason, 
just as reason remains the pursuit of transcendence when ostensibly religious motivation 
fades (1992b: 51, 163).
Relatedly, Gellner confidently depicts the non- or anti-religious movements and doctrines of 
the high modern age – Marxism, Comteanism, nationalism, neo-Darwinian visions of 
progress – as ‘worldly religion’, ‘God surrogates’, a ‘new theodicy’ (1988: 141-44). He 
viewed Marxist socialism in particular as a messianic danger to liberal modernity, best 
analysed theoretically as the (failed) ‘secular Calvinism of emulative collective 
industrialisation’ (1996a: 671, 668), and something to be given, on those grounds, primarily 
anthropological attention – duly provided in two interesting books by Gellner on Soviet 
theories of history. He also came to decide that modern counter-religious ‘secular ideologies’ 
had become finally ineffective by around 1990 (1992b: 151), and was quite prepared – if 
somewhat archly – to admit that his own secular rationalism was a every inch a 
‘fundamentalism’ in that it could not conclusively or rationally be justified as a life picture.
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However, whether these first two areas of discussion suffice – for Gellner or anyone else – to 
overthrow secularism in every respect, or to obliterate all distinctions between religious 
outlooks and secular reason, is another matter.
Eurocentrism
Postcolonial theorists and activists are especially prominent in charging western secular 
theories of socio-historical development with being viciously teleological and Eurocentric. 
The ‘stadial’ theories of the Enlightenment, it is said, based on supremacist ideas about racial 
rankings and laced with pseudo-biological notions of organic maturation, contrived to present 
western modernity as the ‘advanced’ stage of collective life and white westerners as the 
leading representatives of the species. Secularism is centrally implicated in all this, because 
all the main progressive outcomes are figured in terms of a decisive universalistic break out 
of local, global and historical religious darkness, with religious societies and practices 
definitively figured as backward. And these tropes, it is asserted, remain at work within 
contemporary (secular) social theory.
Gellner appears at first sight to be fair game for this postsecular assault, notably in Plough, 
Sword, and Book. He greatly admired the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers who invented 
historical sociology. He manages to reduce their number of paradigmatic stages from four to 
three (hunter-gathering, Agraria, Industria). He thinks of each stage as a kind of ‘species’ 
comprising particular combinations of production, coercion and cognition; and he declares 
that the decisive transitions are irreversible (1974: 202; 1988: 20). Of course, we are dealing 
here with issues of great complexity, requiring more than gestural treatment.  One vital 
question is whether postcolonialism does in fact entail postsecularism (see e.g. Robbins, 
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2013); another is whether postcolonial analysis itself can plausibly do without sociological 
categories, aspirations to generalised theoretical validity, and a political morality of human 
progress (see e.g. McLennan, 2013); and a third is whether the classic Enlightenment 
theorists, though undoubtedly people of their ideological times, were in effect laying out the 
basis for the intellectual critique of ‘racial’ thinking about people and cultures. Gellner 
certainly thought so, though in typically arrogant fashion, he snappily brushed off the charge 
of Eurocentrism. 
He had his conceptual reasons. The ‘truncated evolutionism’ that he advocated was designed 
to be the very opposite of a delusional ‘eternal and global story’ based upon ‘conceptual 
megalomania’ (Gellner, 1974: 202). Rather, it sought to identify specific, highly 
‘idiosyncratic’ phenomena within a wider understanding of ‘pattern, preconditions and 
implications’ that then, taken together, pose significant normative ‘options’ for us all. 
‘Preoccupation with development’, understood thus, was what Gellner held characterized 
sociology as an enterprise, and what made it distinctively valuable. If we want to grasp what 
is going on in the world, and over time, we have no alternative, he argued, to this way of 
scanning things.
As for regarding the European crucible being cast as culturally privileged and superior, the 
breakthrough to secular modernity for Gellner was just a matter of plain fact, the fact of being 
first, and the fact that what ensued was the most profound transformation imaginable. The 
shift of gear involved at least fifteen distinct and contingent items, thus representing a multi-
causal outcome, an accidental concatenation of forces, something that happened to happen. 
Given all that contingency, Gellner could cheerfully concede that perhaps we didn’t really 
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have an ‘explanation’ for it at all, that it was something of a ‘miracle’ (1988: 158ff). So the 
arrival of secular modernity in the west was not pre-selected, nor were mankind’s intrinsic 
needs being appropriately met in the form of this society, this historical moment. When both 
of these features are present – pre-selection, general needs specially met – and invested with a 
pre-constructed moral vision such that the whole picture conveys historical necessity, then of 
course that does amount to illegitimate teleological projection. Gellner thought that it could 
be found aplenty in Hegel and Marx, a rather disastrous instance of secularism’s extension of 
religious modes of apprehension. But his own perfectly proper, methodologically secular, 
retrospective functionalist analysis of patterns and preconditions, founded on the empirical 
observation of threshold events, was not like that at all. A final point to make in this context 
is that Gellner regularly drew attention to the speed and opportunist intelligence with which 
‘baton changing’ between societies occurs in the historical process. Winners and losers, 
therefore, can never be specified in advance. Overall, then, Gellner’s concern with patterned 
societal emergence had nothing to do with producing a ‘unilineal and single-track theory’ 
(1979: 338). 
Positivism
Gellner, I have said, did not think that a whole society or culture could move from being 
completely religious to completely secular, or that humans would ever be completely post-
religious, or completely disenchanted. This is because culture and identity, including religion, 
touch parts of us, and serve social purposes, that science/reason cannot. But culturalism is not 
thereby vindicated, because the emergence of scientific rationality as demonstrably and 
consensually cross-cultural has, in Gellner’s view, uniquely and forever broken the grip of, 
and the prospects for, singular all-encompassing worldviews. One particular strand of 
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Western modernity, subsequently available to, and actively at work within, any number of 
alternative modernities, emerges as a profoundly context-breaking idiom. That strand is 
science, or more specifically the cognitive ethic of analytical scientific method. Once this 
mind-set is disseminated and seen to be uniquely effective, there is no going back to the 
characteristic amalgamated programmes of religion-dominated epochs, in which knowledge, 
the sacred, ritual, social belonging, moral authority, and sense of self are indissolubly 
entwined and mutually reinforcing. The ‘way back is blocked’, he claims, because a decisive 
shift has taken place, from ‘a world in which cognition is not sovereign to one in which it is’ 
(1988: 204; 1974: 4). All faiths and local cultures must and do make their peace with science, 
and none can survive otherwise. It is above all in this positivism that Gellner’s secularism 
chiefly consists, making the proposition that religion and secularity are ‘mutually 
constitutive’ (Casanova) not merely factually questionable, but intellectually slipshod. 
Gellner does not put it quite like this, but the principal problem with such equations is the 
genetic fallacy, commission of which is startlingly pervasive in anti- and post-secular 
argumentation at the present time: ‘secular’ ideas originated in profoundly religious contexts, 
and were developed for theological reasons, therefore secular thinking must forever bear the 
mark of, and indeed be subordinate to, its religious progenitor. Gellner would view this form 
of reasoning as both gullible and lazy, perversely denying the reality of historical emergence 
and failing to grasp the specific logic of the momentous changes in the conditions of social 
life and self-understanding as a result of modern science and technology. Accordingly, for 
him, the real subject of philosophic history is not cultural continuity, but ‘our collective 
change of identity’ (1992a: 58, 1988: 194).
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The logic is straightforward enough, yet Gellner is astonished how easily, in relativist and 
culturalist thought, the sheer epistemic power of the scientific ethos, though almost never 
denied, is all too conveniently overlooked. Especially in Legitimation of Belief, Gellner 
details the ‘Copernican revolution’ whereby the self-legitimating, totalised, circular, closed, 
capricious, meaning-suffused, authority-assuming, problem-displacing religious cosmic 
canopy is penetrated, disaggregated, eroded, and eventually de-legitimated by an attitude of 
appraisal that takes nothing for granted, regards nothing as sacred, treats all sources, 
advocates and claims as unprivileged, subjecting all, and equally, to rigorous test procedures. 
Nothing should command our allegiance in advance or without passing through that fierce 
lens of critical, levelling scrutiny. Gellner honours Descartes, Hume and Kant as the classic 
philosophers of this stupendous shift in our relation to the world.  Despite the (deep) flaws in 
their respective conceptual schemes, together these thinkers established the indispensability 
of rigorous ‘selector’ filters in separating out the decideable content of all comprehensive 
doctrines from their inspirational and ontological hinterlands. Henceforth, legitimation could 
only come from the reason within us, or externally, from nature. ‘The secularisation of the 
world can hardly go any further’ (1988: 126). Gellner’s point is not only that religions lack 
independent validation by these standards, it is also that faith-holders themselves become 
compelled to conceive of states of affairs existing outside the specifications of their 
discourses, and to postulate real conditions under which their beliefs do not hold. Thereafter, 
whether held imperatively or half-heartedly, faiths cease to ‘fill out the world’ or control the 
evidence (1974: 176, 206). Their rationale changes fundamentally.
A number of things about Gellner’s positivism can be underlined, relative to the 
postsecularism debates. One is that his motivation and arguments are as much sociological as 
epistemological. He wants us, for example, lucidly to attend not only to the fact of the big 
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ditch, but to what lies ‘on either side of it’ (1974: 183). And on the far side lies a tough, 
narrow social world of agrarian toil and doctrinal subservience, with coercion primary over 
production and cognition. Today’s ‘re-enchanters’ therefore, are being either delusional or 
politically foolish in summoning up the lost ‘wholeness’ of those ways of life as something 
feasible or desirable for ourselves. Another stark question is this: leaving aside all the niceties 
of philosophical conceptualization, is it or is it not the case, as a social fact about the global 
world, that scientific rationality and its technological spin-offs are indeed held as valid across 
very different cultural settings and traditions, and are radically transforming our shared 
condition? Gellner often goes off at this point into dismissive perorations to the effect that 
whenever people today, anywhere, want to pursue matters of wealth and health, or to make 
real decisions, they turn to secular scientific rationality, with matters of culture and religion 
merely doing service as ‘interior decorations’, ‘antiquated furnishings’ (1974: 147-48). But 
the underlying thought remains powerful (though we might want to add something about the 
capitalist structuration of science and technology). ‘Hard’ knowledge not only works its way 
out of the grasp of particular cultural settings and values, it works against culture conceived 
as an indivisible subjectifying force. Even if it is only certain methods and attitudes that 
transcend context, this is universality enough to render cultural diversity only ever partial and 
always under examination. Culture thus becomes a mixed, split, ‘ironically’ experienced 
phenomenology, in which not only formal sets of ideas but the ordinary world of everyday 
life becomes problematical, ‘interim’ in status, as we invest and populate it with a number of 
diverse, stratified criteria and purposes. Illuminatingly, Gellner calls this the ‘second 




Following from his admiration for the stern ‘selector’ epistemologies, Gellner is consistently 
sceptical about what he terms philosophical ‘re-endorsement’ (e.g.1974: Ch 3; 1987: Ch. 11). 
This involves a thoroughgoing contextualism when it comes to understanding ideas and 
cultural formations, and a tendency to regard sets of claims and practices as coherent wholes, 
unified ‘forms of life’. Re-endorsing enquiries tend to be anti-positivist and expansively 
pluralistic in approach, denying any independent criteria with which to ground socio-cultural 
evaluation. Gellner conducts a career-long campaign against re-endorsement, taking on many 
thinkers in this broad mould, from Wittgenstein to Feyerabend, Geertz to Marcus and 
Clifford, Austin to Berlin, hermeneutics to postmodernism. As the label indicates, what he 
most dislikes is the inherent inclination of re-endorsement to leave the world and its 
component cultures as they are, looking whole and feeling wholesome. There are three 
problems with that presumption and result. One is that, in the modern world, 
cultures/identities are not in fact whole, they are cross-cut and split, largely because of the 
power and inroads of capitalism, science and technology. Accordingly, Gellner derides the 
way re-endorsers summon up the precious richness of the Lebenswelt only, in effect, to 
cheapen it: if the life-world really still existed in the deeply immersive form posited, we 
would be silently living its categories, not naming and blessing them (1974: 106). Secondly, 
re-endorsement construes social science and philosophy as essentially descriptive enterprises: 
you tease out the self-understandings of a social formation, reconstruct its everyday 
meanings-in-use, and that’s about it. For Gellner, this amounts to a complacent ‘cult of self-
explanatoriness’ in which cultural practices are treated as though they are chains of affective 
symbolic significance only, containing or implying no substantive claims about the world that 
are in need of further, external characterization and judgment. Meanings, he accepts, are 
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crucial, but they neither constitute nor exhaust the world. In short, re-endorsement jettisons 
the concept of ideology. 
Perhaps the most important point for Gellner is the hypocrisy or dissimulation of re-
endorsement. Although re-endorsers play up the irreducible singularities of what they 
describe, they don’t actually endorse all forms of life as self-described: their own favoured 
cultures, groups and values are always smuggled in through some back door (1992a: 85). Nor 
do re-endorsers cease to think propositionally or ideologically. As products of the modern, 
analytical, scientific ethos, they are supplying ‘external’ rationalization and reconstruction all 
the time, even when the tone is piously appreciative. We should bear in mind here that, for 
Gellner, the problem with relativism is not so much its oft-cited self-contradictoriness –
making a universal claim as to the non-universality of every claim – but its emptiness as a 
strategy for thought when strictly pursued. Genuine adherents to strong faiths, for example, 
are unlikely to be grateful to those seeking to honour them within a thinned out, uncommitted 
meta-level pluralism (1974: 47-50; 1987: 160; 1992a: 71-74).
Elements of re-endorsement theory, thus conceived, are visible within contemporary post-
secularism. A common argument, for example, is that even to regard religions as essentially 
matters of belief is merely a secular ploy. ‘Religion’, it is held, defies clear description, 
because we are dealing with dense and multiple collective practices, ways of being and 
significances that are not well grasped as truth claims or scientific hypotheses or as pertaining 
to the causal properties of real supernatural agencies. For Gellner, this amounts to 
postmodern evasion and ‘irresponsibly a priori ethnography’, the kind of stripping out of ‘all 
contentions about the world’ from ‘concrete traditions of faith’ that in fact hugely distorts 
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them (1974: 143). One instance of this postsecular trait – all the more effective because its 
author would be appalled by the ‘postmodernist’ tag – is Terry Eagleton’s attempt, in the 
book cited earlier, to stave off bone-headed atheist demands that God’s being is something 
that needs to be demonstrated. Instead of the familiar ‘mega-manufacturer’ of the world, 
Eagleton wants us to think of God as what sustains us in his love, and the reason there is 
something rather than nothing. Qua love and political, humanitarian purpose, it makes no 
sense, Eagleton advises, to debate God’s actual existence (Eagleton, 2009: 6-8). But this is 
spurious, and something of an insult to millions of ordinary Christians. Whether conceived as 
loving mentor, peacenik, artistic genius, or the moral source of all that is decent in human 
existence, Eagleton’s image of God inescapably presupposes a super-attribute being or form 
having ontological status, causal powers, and remarkably human-like motivations. If it is true, 
as Eagleton insists, that fundamental metaphysical questions do not necessarily require God 
as an answer (Eagleton, 2009: 13), then invoking Him becomes strictly optional.
Gellner’s other criticisms of re-endorsement can be illustrated by reference to neo-vitalist 
takes on secularism and postsecularism. William Connolly, for example, asks us to notice that 
standard secularist thinking constantly manoeuvres to screen out any ‘metaphysics of the 
supersensible’, thereby constituting an exclusionary metaphysics of its own; a twisted, wintry 
doctrinal stance towards the ‘protean energies’ that flow through the organization of all 
things. Instead, a more life-enhancing approach of ‘multiple loyalties’ should be cultivated, 
as part of a new ‘democratic adventure’ of the soul, with loyalty to religious commitments as 
part of that. But it is not as though Connolly himself is advocating or directly supporting any 
specific religious belief, he is merely withdrawing from the committing parts of the secular 
endeavour. This is why he finally designates his own position as ‘ironic evangelical atheism’ 
and ‘non-theistic gratitude’, the agonistics of which a perceptive review on an Islamicist 
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website described as wholly lacking in confessional content and only intelligible within a 
secularist worldview (Connolly, 1999: 24, 54, 88, 95, 159).
In similar fashion, Rosi Braidotti (2008: 13-18) disavows any necessary connection between 
secularism and either critical theory or the feminist heritage. She advocates a positive 
political approach to religious groups and a spirituality-endorsing version of feminism, 
including feminist theology. As with Connolly, the goal is to work towards a new politics, 
one involving ‘inter-relations with non-human, post-human and inhuman forces’, thus
producing affirmative ‘counter-subjectivities’. These suggestive ideas are designed to 
embrace and harness the ‘creative potential’ that subsists in all beings and movements, not 
least religious ones. Yet as Gellner anticipated, it turns out that generous affirmation across 
the board proves mightily elusive. ‘Classical vitalism’ itself doesn’t make the grade, for 
example, because Braidotti thinks it is tainted by fascistic political connotations. Her sense of 
the need for ‘multiple modes of interaction with heterogeneous others’ leads to an embrace of 
Muslims, but not the Pope. And the renewed endorsement of passionate life and lived 
realities doesn’t remotely stretch to the vital energies of the heterosexual family, masculine 
competitiveness, or the visceral buzz of violent conflict.
Regarding Charles Taylor, there is a striking parallel to be drawn between his and Gellner’s 
career-long concerns, each producing a series of books at a similar rate, handling many of the 
same themes, at a common remove from the philosophical mainstream. They even managed 
to concoct, with almost no reference to one other, nearly identical phrases in their 
descriptively congruent account of the coming of secularity: Durkheimian pre-agrarian 
religion, a generic notion of theological Reforming zeal, the spiritual ‘malaise’ of modernity, 
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socio-philosophical ‘package deals’, the fractured ‘phenomenology’ of modern experience, 
‘our’ collective predicament, the ‘mutilated’ sense of being that the secular world instils in 
some people, the rise to prominence, and problematical nature, of ‘ordinary life’. Beyond 
those affinities, however, Taylor and Gellner marshalled very different evaluative stances, 
brought out to some extent in a head-to-head in The Listener (Gellner and Taylor, 1986), but 
definitively articulated in Gellner’s long review of Taylor’s book on Hegel. Gellner’s 
analysis is remarkable, because in dissecting the core of that 1975 production, he also 
accurately anticipates the background problematic of Taylor’s major later works, Sources of 
the Self and A Secular Age.  Respectful and generous for once, Gellner commends Taylor’s 
‘impressive’ Hegel scholarship, noting that it constitutes a ‘substantive contribution to social 
thought’ in its own right (1979: 18). But Taylor, Gellner notes, is drawn to Hegel for the very 
reason that we should all have pulled decisively away from him: the seductiveness of his 
philosophically loose ambivalence as between theism, pantheism, and atheism. Taylor’s 
update on this is labelled ‘expressivism’: the way in which identities situated in the (partially) 
alienated conditions of modernity are postulated to exude a certain local-collective cultural 
life, which in turn gains dignity from the part it plays in the story of humanity’s longer term 
self-realisation/redemption. Taylor lacks Hegel’s grotesque megalomania, Gellner allows, but 
the romanticism even of Taylor’s mundane version – The ‘Absolute in Braces’ is the witty 
title of the article – remains disturbing. Hegelianism is philosophically cowardly, for Gellner, 
because the divinization and humanization of the world are indiscriminately fused, and 
rationalized from the vantage point of the completed totality, with all the evidence already 
pre-judged. The Owl of Minerva always has a comfortable flight, we might say, with no one 
around to witness it. Moreover, expressionism under the sign of Hegel is politically 
dangerous: despite valuing the private freedoms of the bourgeois individual, a grand 
significance is conferred on the frustrated and rather pathetic modern self through its notional 
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participation in the higher mission of the social and indeed the cosmic order as a whole. For 
Gellner, this leads directly to Nuremberg rallies. As an antidote, we need to esteem and 
protect, more than Hegelians (or Marxists), the reviled atomism, liberalism, relative 
prosperity and intellectual secularity of the modern situation, and its distinction between 
public politics and personal life.
Conclusion: the triangle softens  
Gellner was particularly opposed to what he called ‘negative re-endorsement’, the sense that 
all would be well with cultural worlds if only the one ‘big error’ blighting outside evaluations 
of them were eliminated. This attitude comes to the fore in postsecular polemic whenever 
secularism is monolithically presented as anathema. Thus, Wendy Brown, Talal Asad Judith 
Butler, and Saba Mahmood (Brown, 2009: 8-18) wish to know, Is critique secular? 
Ostensibly subject to discussion, what is really being asked/asserted is Is critique necessarily 
secular, given that secularism is so clearly and awfully bad? As with Braidotti, this is a 
challenge to critical theory, feminism and the Left generally, as well as to western liberals of 
all complexions. After all – the key points are often framed, disingenuously, as curiously 
probing questionings – is not the very idea of secular/criticism the definitive product of 
‘Enlightenment conceits’ that privilege dubious notions of realism and objectivity against 
supposedly mystified religious authority or prejudice? Does not secularism just schemingly 
veil ‘the religious shape and content of Western public life and its imperial designs’? Is it not 
about supporting the ‘daily coercions exercised by the inarticulate powers coursing through 
liberal orders?’ Being essentially Christian, can secularism possibly ‘fathom the violence or 
moral injury’ it visits upon non-western religious traditions and practices, as in the Dutch 
cartoon case of violence against Muslims?
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These are largely rhetorical and highly leading questions, pursued to no serious extent; their 
very utterance is taken to be ‘devastating’. And yet Brown et al.’s own ‘conceit’ is to parade 
their convictions as ‘open-ended reflection’, aimed to ‘loosen critique’, to re-imagine ‘the 
work of critique’, pointing towards a more ‘open hermeneutic’, not to obliterate critique 
completely in the name of faith or anything else. Gellner was wholly unconvinced by 
negative re-endorsers, in two respects, and they both apply to this ‘critique of critique’ 
discourse. One was the implausibility of their underlying paradoxical neutrality, their deeper-
than-liberalism liberality: ‘what are the motives of those who wish to endorse all cultures?’ 
What kind of moral substance requires no need for philosophy to judge ‘cultures and their 
faiths’? (1974: 54, 143). His other objection was that, as it turns out, and quite crucially, the 
full logic of negative re-endorsement never holds. In our postsecular case, critique in a fairly 
familiar and completely ‘secular’ sense cannot be abandoned, because the ‘work’ that it does 
involves setting up a form of rationalisation – here, secularism – as ideological, i.e. distorted, 
self-absorbed, false, doing violence, othering, and all this because it is expressive of the 
power interests of certain social groups or the structure-in-dominance of particular social 
formations as a whole. The replacement vantage point for critique then emerges as 
epistemically superior and attached to no special agenda other than egalitarian betterment and 
the broader truth. But the trouble specifically for postsecularism in this vein is that the whole 
pattern of condemnation relies upon and duplicates precisely those background regulative 
notions that are the very subject of the inquisition: a deeper realism, greater objectivity, and a 
more emancipatory version of progress. 
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I have been seeking to illustrate and extend Gellner’s defence of a certain form of secular 
understanding. To my mind this continues to be extremely insightful, and intellectually 
necessary, in relation to today’s preoccupations. Whilst postsecular questions – let me be 
clear – are interesting and important, Gellner’s distinctive voice pushes us to work (in the 
phrase of another thinker he thought was a re-endorser, Alasdair MacIntyre) ‘against the self-
images of the age’, even when those self-images may be progressive. Ultimately, Gellner’s 
secularism is incomplete and internally tensed: it is not, was not intended to be, a grand or 
watertight worldview. As a methodological positivist, he had reservations about substantive 
philosophies of materialism, humanism, and socialism. As a liberal, he had qualms about his 
personal atheism taking on the mantle of public service ideology, except as unstinting 
opposition to theocracy. 
Despite his formidable self-confidence, Gellner chafed and worried about the antinomies 
within his thought. For example, he was deeply stung to be thought personally devoid of the 
passions of cultural identity, responding that for him, like anyone else, nostalgia, common 
ritual and bonding with fellow human beings were the most important things in life (e.g. 
1996a: 626). Yet his paean to culture-transcending science and his insistence on the –
impossible – rigours of philosophic ‘cosmic exile’ removed him from the pull of affective 
solidarities. These frictions are poignantly played out in the tribulations of ‘Prometheus 
perplexed’ in Reason and Culture. One the one hand, we have to accept that the correct and 
utterly ‘mandatory’ meta-theory for human cognition is socially ‘worthless’ (1992b: 174). 
This is because quasi-positivistic understanding, given its very logic, cannot be absolutized or 
elevated into anything grander and vaguer than knowledge itself, the process of tracking 
truth. On the other hand, and inconsistently, Gellner also argues that we need to propagate the 
ethos of cognition ‘for Hegelian reasons’ – that is to say, for the wider cultural, political and 
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effect and inspiration it might deliver, at least by way of countering more dangerous and 
spurious alternatives (Gellner, 1985: 66). This mixed message in turn leaves open the 
question of whether some kind of ‘Left Gellnerism’ might be developed, a secular(ish) 
project seeking to synthesise the liberating side of science, fearless intellectual scrutiny of 
self and others, and a collective politics of equality and diversity. Gellner himself thought 
not, but perhaps the fire of that radical modernist imaginary can be re-kindled, in spite of the 
times.
In conclusion, it needs to be added that Gellner’s image of a three-sided contest in which 
reason, relativism, and religion are strongly angled against one another is overdrawn, as he 
half-admitted when identifying the pros and cons of each (1992a: 84ff). Whether we call this 
the consequence of structural and cultural ‘de-differentiation’ or not, each of the component 
relationships – scientific rationality/religion, religion/relativism, relativism/reason (especially 
sociological reason, we should add, which cannot work without a hefty quantum of relativity) 
– can be figured more productively and integrally than Gellner allowed. The triangle does not 
melt away completely, but it softens, becomes a kind of Penrose triangle, with each side first 
appearing clean and distinct, then morphing into another line of approach. The resulting set of 
orientations might well be considered postsecular, but that would be the sort of 
postsecularism that only makes sense within a broader secular horizon in which our species is 
on its own, and consumed by history. 
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